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Changing Hands: Recommendations to Improve
New York’s System of Gubernatorial Succession
Fordham Law School Rule of Law Clinic*
Ian Bollag-Miller, Stevenson Jean, Maryam Sheikh, & Frank Tamberino
June 2022
Executive Summary of Recommendations
The Clinic recommends the following reforms to New York’s gubernatorial succession
framework:
(1) Adoption of a “voluntary” gubernatorial inability provision permitting a governor,
recognizing their own inability to discharge the powers and duties of their office, to
temporarily transfer the powers and duties of the office to the lieutenant governor and
subsequently reclaim the powers and duties by written declaration;
(2) Adoption of an “involuntary” gubernatorial inability provision:
(a) transferring the powers and duties of the office of governor to the lieutenant
governor upon a written declaration of gubernatorial inability by a majority of a
Disability Commission, comprised of: the lieutenant governor, the attorney
general, the comptroller, the president pro tempore of the Senate, the speaker of
the Assembly, and the minority leaders of the Senate and Assembly; and
(b) upon written declaration by the governor contesting the inability declaration,
referring the dispute for resolution by the Court of Appeals;
(3) Removal of the state’s gubernatorial absence provision, or, alternatively, clarification of
the absence provision to transfer the powers and duties of the office to the lieutenant
governor only upon the “effective” absence of the governor from the state;
(4) Adoption of a procedure to replace the lieutenant governor in the event of a vacancy:
(a) within 20 days of the governor’s assumption of office, requiring the governor to
designate in advance a successor to the lieutenant governor in the event of a
vacancy from among the following officials: attorney general, comptroller, and
most recently elected president pro tempore of the Senate and speaker of the
Assembly; and
(b) Requiring the lieutenant governor successor designation to be confirmed by a
majority of both houses of the Legislature;
(5) Adoption of language clarifying that (1) a temporary president of the Senate or speaker of
the Assembly must vacate their legislative position before acting as governor or assuming
the office of governor and (2) the entitlement of a successor to serve as governor is not
based on the successor continuing to hold their prior office.

*

The Rule of Law Clinic is supervised by Professors John D. Feerick (jfeerick@fordham.edu)
and John Rogan (rogan@fordham.edu).
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Introduction
Over the past 15 years, the offices of governor and lieutenant governor of New York have seen
unanticipated turnovers. In March 2008, Governor Eliot Spitzer resigned amidst a prostitution
scandal.1 Lieutenant Governor David Paterson ascended to the governorship, and, over a year
later, appointed Richard Ravitch to fill his former office. 2 In August 2021, Governor Andrew
Cuomo resigned amidst sexual harassment allegations, leaving his lieutenant, Kathy Hochul, to
take the office.3 Most recently, Lieutenant Governor Brian Benjamin—who had been appointed
to that post by Hochul—resigned after an indictment on federal bribery and fraud charges. 4
Despite the frequency with which the state’s highest executive offices have changed hands, New
York is unprepared to deal with a panoply of issues relating to its constitution’s gubernatorial
succession provisions. In this memorandum, the Fordham Law School Rule of Law Clinic
proposes reforms to address four principal issues with the existing gubernatorial succession
provisions: gubernatorial inability, gubernatorial absence, lieutenant governor replacement, and
the gubernatorial line of succession.
Section I investigates the New York State constitution’s gubernatorial inability provision. It
discusses inability provisions in the U.S. Constitution and those adopted by other states, and
recommends the adoption of procedural mechanisms for both voluntary and involuntary
declarations of gubernatorial inability. Section II analyzes the state’s antiquated gubernatorial
absence provision, arguing that it has become unnecessary and should be removed. Section III
explores New York’s Senate leadership crisis of 2009 and recommends a procedure to replace
the lieutenant governor in the event of a vacancy. Finally, Section IV explores the ambiguities
and inconsistencies in the gubernatorial line of succession and proposes reforms to address them.
Several fundamental principles of political succession inform our discussion of the New York
succession provisions. While there is no clear hierarchy among them—indeed, in certain
instances they may be in conflict—responsible constitutional reform in this area should give
them adequate consideration. First, succession provisions should ensure the continuity of
executive leadership. Efficiency of transition is essential to minimize gaps in leadership and
ensure someone will always be able to exercise the executive’s powers and duties. 5 Second,
political parties and affiliation should have a proper role in political decisions regarding filling
vacancies in elected offices.6 Third, the separation and independence of the executive,
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Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign.html.
2
Richard Briffault, Skelos v. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the Governor’s Surprising Power to
Appoint a Lieutenant Governor, 73 ALB. L. REV. 675, 678 (2010).
3
Marina Villanueve, Gov. Andrew Cuomo Resigns Over Sexual Harassment Allegations, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.
10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/andrew-cuomo-resigns-17161f546bb83c32a337036ecf8d2a34.
4
William K. Rushbaum et al., Lt. Gov. Benjamin Resigns Following Campaign Finance Indictment, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/12/nyregion/brian-benjamin-resigns-indicted.html.
5
Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 981 (2010).
6
Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345, 347-48 (2002).
Wasserman also notes a fourth principle: structural federalism, which balances the relation between state and
federal governments.
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legislative, and judicial branches must be respected. 7 Fourth, democratic legitimacy of those in
power must be ensured. The voice of the electorate must be respected as the ultimate source of
political authority.8 This idea is related to the “elective principle,” by which, generally, an
election should be the preferred means of filling vacancies in elective offices.9
I. Gubernatorial Inability
In 1938, Illinois Governor Henry Horner suffered a heart attack. Unable to physically attend
meetings, he supposedly worked only a few hours a day from the governor’s mansion, and only a
select group of friends and advisors (dubbed the “bedside cabinet”) were permitted to see him. 10
Horner’s associates claimed he was merely secluded to facilitate his recovery. His political
opponents pointed to the state constitution’s gubernatorial inability provision, which, in theory,
would have devolved power onto the lieutenant governor.11 But the language of that provision
was not clear enough to resolve the dispute. The result was two years of political turmoil, during
which it was not clear whether an elected official was carrying out the powers of the state’s
highest office.12
The Illinois constitution’s gubernatorial inability provision was virtually identical to the
corresponding provision in New York’s current constitution. The New York provision provides
that “[i]n case the governor is impeached, is absent from the state or is otherwise unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of governor, the lieutenant-governor shall act as
governor until the inability shall cease or until the term of the governor shall expire.”13
The 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which was ratified in 1967, addressed similar
issues in the Constitution’s original presidential inability provision. 14 Health-related incapacity
scares during the Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower administrations had highlighted the need for
an update to the constitutional succession provisions. 15 Section 3 of the 25th Amendment, the
“voluntary” inability provision, permits the president to transfer power to the vice president in
recognition of a present or future inability by a written declaration, and then to reclaim it by the
same means.16 Section 4, the “involuntary” provision, addresses the more complicated situation
in which the president is unable or unwilling to declare their own incapacity. It sets forth a
detailed procedure permitting the vice president, acting with a majority of the Cabinet or another
body created by Congress, to declare presidential inability and transfer power to the vice
7

Id.
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 348.
9
See Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 151 (2009).
10
Clyde F. Snider, Gubernatorial Disability, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 522-23 (1941).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 526.
13
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
14
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Delaware delegate John Dickinson
articulated two questions raised by the language of the presidential disability clause: “What is the extent of the term
‘disability’” and “Who is to be the judge of it?” John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Crafting and
Drafting Process, 10 CONLAWNOW 161 (2019) (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427
(Max Farrand ed., 1911)). For the authoritative account of the 25th Amendment’s drafting, interpretations, and uses,
see JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS (2014).
15
Goldstein, supra note 5, at 966.
16
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
8
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president.17 If the president contests the inability declaration and the vice president and Cabinet
reassert the inability declaration, the provision provides that the president returns to power unless
two-thirds of both houses of Congress agree within 21-days that the president is unable.18 The
25th Amendment is generally acknowledged to have addressed some of the most significant
ambiguities in the original inability provision. 19
After the 25th Amendment’s adoption, many states amended their constitutions to address similar
concerns related to gubernatorial inability. Still, 19 states have no formal procedures for
determining gubernatorial inability. 20 Despite recommendations from the New York State Law
Revision Commission in 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, New York has not reformed its inability
provision.21
One may critique the New York constitution’s inability provision for its failure to clearly define
the term “inability.” Indeed, some states do provide a more limiting definition of inability. 22
Alabama, for instance, limits grounds for removal based on inability to the governor’s “unsound
mind,” and Mississippi specifies “protracted illness” as a permissible basis to exercise the
inability provision.23 But creating an exhaustive definition risks unnecessarily limiting the scope
of the clause and foreclosing situations of true incapacity that may be unforeseen at the time of
drafting.24 As such, designation of the decision-makers and the process of the inability
determination are the most important features of an effective disability provision. 25
A. Guiding Principles
Lack of a procedure to determine gubernatorial inability and initiate a transition of power in an
efficient and legitimate way is bad public policy. 26 Fortunately, the inability section of the New
York constitution has never been needed. 27 But that does not mean that a gubernatorial
incapacity will never arise. And if it does, the consequences for the public may be significant.
Such a circumstance is clearly ripe for partisan squabbling. But there could be especially serious
implications if an inability arises in a time of crisis that requires swift executive action, such as a

17

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. The Cabinet consists of the leaders of the executive departments listed in 5 U.S.C.
§ 101.
18
Id.
19
Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the Presidential Inability Provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 10
CONLAWNOW 119, 134 (2019).
20
Michael Hutter, “Who’s In Charge?”: Proposals to Clarity Gubernatorial Inability to Govern and Succession, 12
GOV’T & POL’Y J. 1, 30 (2010).
21
Id.
22
William E. Rafferty, Gubernatorial Removal and State Supreme Courts, 11 J. APP. PRAC. &. PROCESS 165, 18486 (2010)
23
ALA. CONST. art. V, § 127; MISS. CONST. art. V, § 131. All state inability provisions are appended below at App.
B.
24
See Goldstein, supra note 19, at 133. For one proposed framework for diagnosing executive disability, see Daniel
J.T. Schuker, Burden of Decision: Judging Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 J.L. &
POL. 97 (2016).
25
Id.
26
Hutter, supra note 20, at 30.
27
Id.
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natural disaster, public health emergency, or, in an extreme scenario, the need to mobilize
National Guard troops in the face of a riot or violent civil unrest. 28
Gubernatorial inability provisions should account for several fundamental principles. They must
provide a procedure efficient enough to avoid unnecessary periods of ambiguity in leadership.
They must respect the voice of the people in electing the incumbent to the office of the governor.
And they must account for the system of checks and balances reflected in the division of powers
among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the state. As the Law Revision
Commission wrote in 1984, “The separation of powers of the three branches of government …
suggests a procedure that is weighted heavily in favor of the elected Governor, involves
representation by all branches of government, and yes is limited to a two-step process.”29
B. Proposals for Reform
1. Voluntary Declaration of Inability
The need for a procedural mechanism facilitating the governor’s voluntary transfer of power to
the lieutenant governor during a present or expected inability is straightforward. 30 When, for
example, a governor requires a medical procedure that will result in prolonged hospitalization, a
formal mechanism for the temporary transfer of power to the lieutenant governor reduces the
temptation to forgo the procedure in order to maintain power.31 Pennsylvania governor Robert
Casey underwent a heart and liver transplant in 1993.32 He transferred authority to his lieutenant
governor, who led the state for more than six months while Mr. Casey recovered.33
Most states that have enacted analogs to the 25th Amendment’s voluntary inability provision
mirror the federal model closely. Delaware’s constitution is emblematic. It provides that
“[w]henever the Governor transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his or her written declaration that he or she is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his or her office, and until he or she transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Lieutenant
Governor as Acting Governor.”34
This provision provides for a written declaration by the governor, which reduces ambiguity
regarding the duration of the power transfer. It also requires a second written declaration by the
governor to re-assume powers and duties. A voluntary inability declaration provision thus puts
the initial determination of inability squarely in the hands of the governor. It permits the
28

Video Interview with Patrick A. Woods, Deputy Director, The Government Law Center, Albany Law School
(Mar. 11, 2022).
29
N.Y. ST. L. REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE 1984
LEGISLATURE RELATING TO GUBERNATORIAL INABILITY AND SUCCESSION 13 (1984) [hereinafter “Law Revision
Commission Report”].
30
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 131 (describing the voluntary inability declaration provision of the 25th Amendment
as “relatively uncontroversial”).
31
Goldstein, supra note 5, at 967-68.
32
Sam Roberts, Giving Up the Reins of Power, but Usually Not for Long, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/nyregion/15governors.html.
33
Mr. Casey’s six-month recovery from the transplant included two postoperative hospitalizations. Id.
34
DEL. CONST. art. III, § 20(b).
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governor to choose when to resume the powers and duties of the office after the inability ceases.
And a voluntary inability declaration can avoid the more politically costly involuntary inability
procedure.35 A voluntary inability provision in New York’s constitution should incorporate these
elements as well.
2. Involuntary Declaration of Inability
When a body other than the governor must declare gubernatorial inability because the governor
is unwilling or unable to do so, the situation becomes more complex. 36 An involuntary inability
declaration provision should provide a two-step process. First, a designated body, other than the
governor, declares the inability.37 Second, if the governor contests the inability, a second
designated body resolves the dispute.38 Some states’ provisions call for a resolution by the entire
state legislature,39 the legislative leadership, 40 or a single executive branch member 41 to declare
gubernatorial inability. Others vest power in a “disability commission” consisting of a mix of
representatives from each branch of government as well as certain medical officials. 42 Still others
designate the state’s highest court for this role.43
A Disability Commission consisting of the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the
comptroller, the speaker of the Assembly, the president pro tempore of the Senate, and minority
leaders of the Senate and Assembly should have the authority to make an initial inability
determination. This approach most effectively reflects the principles of efficiency, democratic
legitimacy, and separation of powers. The group should have seven members, which facilitates
meaningful but swift deliberation.
The process for the designated body to declare inability should balance the principles of
efficiency and democratic legitimacy. It should also set the bar for an inability declaration high
enough that it will not be used for partisan gamesmanship, without making the declaration a
practical impossibility. The primary procedural considerations during the first phase are the
proportion of the designated declaratory body required to make the pronouncement and the
opportunity for a second phase if the governor disputes the inability declaration. Some state
provisions require a simple majority, 44 some require unanimity,45 and some call for some
35

Goldstein, supra note 5, at 968.
It has been described as a “nightmare scenario.” Fresh Air: Trump’s Fitness to Serve is Officially Part of the
Discussion in Congress, NPR (May 4, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/04/526857048/trump-s-fitness-to-serveis-officially-part-of-the-discussion-in-congress (interview with Evan Osnos).
37
In the federal context, the 25th Amendment permits the vice president, acting with a majority of the president’s
Cabinet, to make the initial inability declaration. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
38
Law Revision Commission Report, supra note 29, at 5-6.
39
See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. II, § 6(d) (“The General Assembly, by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of all its
members in the joint session, may adopt a resolution declaring … disability.”).
40
See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. V, § 10(c) (president pro tempore of the Senate and the speaker of the House of
Representatives).
41
See, e.g., KY. CONST. art. VI, § 84 (attorney general).
42
See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. III, § 20 (establishing a disability commission of the chief justice of the Supreme
Court, the president of the Medical Society of Delaware, and the commissioner of the Department of Mental
Health).
43
See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 11.
44
See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
45
See, e.g., KY. CONST. art. VII, § 84.
36
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proportion in between.46 For a seven-member Disability Commission, requiring the affirmative
vote of six members would ensure general consensus without giving veto power to any single
member. The inclusion of the legislative minority leaders on the Commission ensures that the
vote of at least one elected representative from the governor’s political party is necessary to
instigate the transition of the powers and duties of the office to the lieutenant governor. This
reduces the risk of the provision being used as an improper political attack on the governor.
Unlike the 25th Amendment’s Section 4 and the states that follow its lead, this procedure permits
an inability declaration even without the lieutenant governor’s participation. 47 This is to avoid a
potential “catch 22” situation where the lieutenant governor is unable or unwilling to declare
even an obvious gubernatorial inability.48
Some states follow the federal model and designate the legislature as the decision-maker in the
event the governor contests an inability declaration.49 Most commonly, however, states empower
their highest court to resolve the dispute. 50 A case of contested gubernatorial inability is, at its
core, a dispute which requires resolution by the government organ best equipped to handle what
may “amount[] to a bench trial.”51 While there may be some concern regarding judges appointed
by a governor being tasked with the decision to remove the governor from power,52 these
concerns are allayed by the insulation of the court from the first phase inability declaration by the
Disability Commission. Even if there is a reluctance by the court to issue a finding of inability,
this would be consistent with the presumption in favor of the incumbent’s retention of the office.
Furthermore, the involvement of the court at the second stage ensures that the full process of the
provision includes each branch of government. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals is the
preferred body to resolve a contested inability.
Procedural efficiency is important but less of a concern for the dispute phase if the gubernatorial
successor acts as governor until a judgment is issued, as many existing state provisions provide. 53
Many states that follow the federal model of conferring decision-making authority to the
legislature also incorporate the 25th Amendment’s establishment of time frames within which the
body must meet and a decision must be rendered.54 But when the state’s highest court is the
dispute resolution body, the timing of the process is less of a concern because there are fewer
individuals who must gather to deliberate, and because the court is already well-practiced in
adjudication.

46

See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 128.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
48
See, e.g., Constitutional Amendment and Accompanying Legislation Addressing Gubernatorial Succession:
Hearing on HJ3 and HB 5090 Before the General Assembly Judiciary Comm., 1984 Leg. (Ct. 1984) (exchange
between Atty. Gen. Lieberman and Rep. Tuliano, Member, G.A. Comm. on Judiciary).
49
Law Revision Commission Report, supra note 29, at 8.
50
William E. Raftery, Gubernatorial Removal and State Supreme Courts, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 165, 188
(2010).
51
Id. at 183-84.
52
Video Interview with Professor Jerry H. Goldfeder, Director, Voting Rights and Democracy Project, Fordham
University School of Law (Feb. 25, 2022).
53
See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(2) (“[T]he Lieutenant Governor shall continue to discharge the same as acting
Governor”).
54
See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 14(5) (requiring the legislature to decide within 21 days of convening).
47
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Because of the decreased importance of the procedural efficiency of dispute resolution, other
components of an inability provision can be implemented to ensure the principles of democratic
legitimacy and presumption in favor of the incumbent can be implemented. For example, New
Hampshire’s provision contains due process protections for the governor. It must “reasonably
appear” that the governor is incapacitated to initiate the process, which protects against arbitrary
invocation by political opponents. The provision also includes a notice and hearing requirement,
and a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the inability determination. 55 These
protections ensure the fairness and transparency of the dispute proceedings.
II. Gubernatorial Absence
Ever since New York’s first constitution was enacted in 1777, the state constitution has provided
for the lieutenant governor to exercise gubernatorial power when the governor is absent from the
state.56 In colonial times, physical absence from the state rendered the governor incapable of
performing many of the powers and duties of their office. 57 However, the development of
modern communication and transportation capabilities permit governors today to continue to
discharge their state duties even when outside state lines. Moreover, the governor’s “presence”
can be achieved through video conferencing, telephone, and email.
In New York, when the governor is physically absent from the state, the absence provision is
automatically invoked, and the lieutenant governor immediately begins acting as governor.58 In
other words, the operative understanding of gubernatorial absence in New York is that a
governor’s physical “absence from the state” renders the governor unable to conduct state duties.
Aside from this no longer being necessarily true, the outcome is absurd: every time the New
York governor crosses a bridge into New Jersey, or leaves the state for an important meeting, the
lieutenant governor becomes governor immediately, empowered to issue executive orders,
deploy the National Guard, appoint judges, and sign or veto legislation. Modern transportation
capabilities make instances of gubernatorial absence more frequent and shorter, increasing the
opportunities for lieutenant governors to misuse gubernatorial powers.
New York should abandon its strict interpretation of gubernatorial absence and only provide for
transfers of power when it is impossible for the governor to communicate and govern. This
interpretation would protect the absent governor’s policies and ensure the continuity of
uninterrupted governance.
A. “Rogue Lieutenant Governors”
Although there are no examples of unreasonable usurpation of power by New York lieutenant
governors, such scenarios are possible. Lieutenant governors in other states have undermined
their governors during absences from the state.

55

N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XLIX(a).
N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
57
See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 23-36 (1965)
(providing an overview of colonial succession arrangements).
58
Hutter, supra note 20, at 29.
56
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On October 6, 2021, while Idaho Governor Brad Little was out of state on official business,
political rival and Lieutenant Governor Janice McGeachin issued an executive order banning
COVID-19 vaccine mandates in schools. This was the third time McGeachin double-crossed the
governor while he was absent from the state. The day before, on October 5, 2021, McGeachin
tried mobilizing the National Guard at the U.S.-Mexico border while Governor Little was
meeting other Republican governors to discuss border policies. McGeachin also issued a statewide mask ban on May 27, 2021, one week after announcing her run for governor. 59
In March 1979, California Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. left the state on official state business
to Washington, D.C. During the 40 hours of the governor’s absence, the governor’s secretary
was informed by the executive assistant to Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb that he intended to
appoint a judge to the vacant presiding justiceship on the Court of Appeal. Despite being advised
that the governor intended to appoint another judge for this position and that his name was
already submitted to the State Bar for evaluation, Lieutenant Governor Curb proceeded hastily
with his judicial appointment the same day. When the governor returned, he withdrew the
appointment and reappointed a judge to the vacancy and simultaneously filled the vacancy
created in the lower court. The governor sued the lieutenant governor, and the Supreme Court of
California decided that because the governor was not “effectively absent,” the lieutenant
governor was not acting within his duties when he claimed to appoint the judge.60
With an absolute definition of absence, the governor may be reluctant to leave the state even for
official state business. In 2008, when he was serving as governor with no lieutenant, David
Paterson avoided leaving the state entirely to avoid confusion about who would act as governor
in his absence, as well as to avoid power falling into the hands of his political opponents.61
B. Effective Absence
During each of the above-described instances of gubernatorial absence, the governor was
physically absent from the state but still capable of communicating with their staff to make
crucial governance decisions using a telephone or the internet. These cases are therefore
illustrative of the distinction between “physical absence” and “effective absence.” While modern
communication technology makes situations of effective gubernatorial absence increasingly rare,
there are examples in recent history where an absence of the governor could have warranted the
transfer of power to the lieutenant governor.
For example, in 2009, South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford disappeared for nearly six days. 62
His personal and state-issued phone were powered off, and he did not respond to phone calls or

59

Maya Yang, Idaho Lieutenant Governor Bans Vaccine Mandates While Governor Out of State, GUARDIAN (Oct.
6, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/06/idaho-janice-mcgeachin-lieutenant-governor-bradlittle.
60
In re Governorship, 26 Cal. 3d 110, 113 (1979).
61
Jeremy W. Peters, Who Would Lead New York if Paterson Left? Who Knows?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/nyregion/07succession.html.
62
Jim Rutenberg & Robbie Brown, Governor Used State’s Money to Visit Lover, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/26sanford.html.
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text messages.63 During the time period when Sanford was functionally unreachable, he was
arguably “effectively absent” from the state, notwithstanding his physical presence in a foreign
country.
C. Guiding Principles
A gubernatorial absence provision reflects the principle that there should always be an individual
capable of exercising the office of the state’s highest executive.64 As the Supreme Court of
Nevada explained, “[T]he crux of a provision for succession in the event of ‘absence’ is the
state’s immediate need for a specific act or function.”65 During the period of history when a
governor’s physical absence from the state rendered them entirely incapable of carrying out the
powers and duties of their office, a constitutional provision automatically transferring the office
to their lieutenant was necessary to permit the governor to travel out of state without effectively
leaving the state without a governor.
D. Proposal for Reforms
While New York uses a strict interpretation, other states’ absence provisions are interpreted with
more nuance. Some state courts, like the California Supreme Court, have required a finding of
“effective absence” to trigger the provision transferring the governor’s powers and duties to the
lieutenant governor. Other states’ provisions require physical absence of the governor for a
minimum amount of time. Given that the president routinely performs government business
while outside of the United States, it is reasonable to allow a governor to continue exercising
state powers outside their state.
Gubernatorial powers should not transfer every time the governor leaves the state. If an absence
from the state caused the governor to become unable to discharge the office’s responsibilities,
the process for declaring gubernatorial inability set forth in the preceding section could be
invoked. As such, the Clinic recommends amending the New York constitution to remove the
absence provision, contingent on the creation of processes for declaring gubernatorial inabilities.
If removal of the absence provision is not possible, then “absence” from the state should be
interpreted to mean “presence outside the state under circumstances that would make it
impossible to govern” or “effectively absent.” This interpretation would allow for governors to
continue conducting state business outside of state lines and would preserve the continuity of
government, as constant transfers of power to the lieutenant governor would be unnecessary.

63

Sanford later admitted that his extramarital affair was the reason for his disappearance. Robbie Brown & Shaila
Dewan, Mysteries Remain After Governor Admits an Affair, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/us/25sanford.html.
64
The text of the state constitution clearly articulates the situation the absence provision was designed to avoid: a
governor who, by virtue of their absence, is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office of governor.”
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III. Lieutenant Governor Succession
New York currently lacks a specifically-designed and permanent legal mechanism for filling
vacancies in the office of the lieutenant governor. Since the landmark 2009 decision of Skelos v.
Paterson, the governor is permitted to fill such vacancies via the catchall provision that is Public
Officers Law 43. 66 This method was necessary during the 2009 New York Leadership Crisis, but
it is inappropriate and insufficient as an enduring solution. The Clinic recommends a reformed
process that safeguards the continuity of government, prioritizes efficiency, and strikes a balance
between the elective principle and the concept of the unified executive. No one of these
principles should dominate; it is important that all are reflected in some form.
The recent controversy stemming from former Lieutenant Governor Brian Benjamin’s
indictment emphasizes the need for a permanent mechanism to fill vacancies in this office.
Indeed, commentators are currently calling for a constitutional amendment to reform the
appointment power granted to the governor in 2009.67 However, this opportunity should not be
squandered with insufficient consideration, nor should a constitutional amendment be taken
lightly. The following discussion canvasses scholarly opinion and the lessons of history to
envision just how such an amendment should look, particularly in light of the damage done
during the crisis of 2009.
A. Guiding Principles
1. Elective Principle
Developing an adequate lieutenant governor replacement process entails balancing different and
often conflicting interests. The elective principle is cited in the two most important cases on New
York lieutenant governor succession: Skelos v. Paterson and Matter of Ward v. Curran.68 The
elective principle is “a fundamental principle of our form of government that a vacancy in an
elective office should be filled by election as soon as practicable after the vacancy occurs.” 69 In
other words, the principle demands that an elective office be filled by election. Since these
decisions, courts have maintained that while the elective principle is important, it cannot always
be “preeminent.”70 Thus, a more abstract concept that one might term elective privity has
emerged. This concept involves positioning an appointment as close to the legitimacy of an
election as possible without sacrificing other, perhaps equally significant ideals. Scholars since
these decisions have approximated close elective privity by, for instance, recommending that
whoever makes the appointment was elected to their respective office, or by only allowing the
appointment of individuals who were elected to whichever office they hold at present.
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2. Unified Executive Principle
The unified executive principle must also be incorporated into any process for filling lieutenant
governor vacancies. Under this concept, the governor is granted the privilege of an
administration populated by generally like-minded officials.71 In other words, the governor
should be permitted to choose officials who share their agenda and therefore act in assistance of
the executive’s goals and beliefs. This is not a principle to favor the governor’s personal mission
or career but rather a method of promoting competent government and thereby effectuating
democracy. If the governor is paired with an official who diverges from their agenda, even if the
selection of that individual is in line with the elective principle, then the government is generally
hampered. Democracy cannot be served if nothing is being accomplished politically.
3. Efficiency of Transition of Leadership
Relatedly, efficiency is a virtue that is central to discussions of lieutenant governor succession.
Delays must be avoided to the greatest extent possible, and gaps in the maintenance and
operation of government must be obviated. But the continuity of government demands rapidity in
the transfer of power that nevertheless cannot overtake the principles outlined above.
B. Proposals for Reform
The Clinic identifies two proposals that provide the best options for reforming the lieutenant
governor replacement process. One proposal is based on the current federal model for filling
vacancies in the office of the vice president that is included in the U.S. Constitution’s 25th
Amendment.72 This proposal would require the governor to appoint a replacement lieutenant
governor in the event of a vacancy with approval from both houses of the state legislature. The
second proposal is based on the approach used in Alaska, which sets a deadline for a newly
elected governor to choose an official who would become lieutenant governor in the event of a
lieutenant governor vacancy. The governor chooses from a limited pool of elected officials. 73
The Clinic proposes a hybrid approach, combining elements of the Federal and Alaska-Woods
Models. First, a newly elected governor, within 20 days of assuming office, would be required to
identify a successor lieutenant governor to serve in the event of a vacancy. This appointment
would need to come from a limited pool of elected officials that should include the attorney
general, the comptroller, the most recently elected temporary president of the Senate, and the
most recently elected speaker of the Assembly. Second, this appointment would then be subject
to confirmation by both houses of the New York State Legislature via majority vote, as in the
71
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25th Amendment process. This confirmation vote would take place at the beginning of the
gubernatorial term, prior to the existence of a vacancy in the office of the lieutenant governor.
1. Historical Background
One of the earliest documents of its kind, the New York State Constitution of 1777 was so
revolutionary that it declared its independence from Great Britain at the same time that it set
forth the structure of the state’s government. On the topic of the executive branch and vacancies
and succession therein, the landmark document states, “…a lieutenant-governor shall, at every
election of a governor, and as often as the lieutenant-governor shall die, resign, or be removed
from office, be elected in the same manner with the governor, to continue in office until the next
election of a governor…”74 Future iterations of the constitution have included provisions that
generally follow this model, with the 1938 constitution providing for the joint election of these
two officials at intervals of four years.75
The 1777 constitution recognized the possibility of lieutenant governor vacancies, stating
“…whenever the government shall be administered by the lieutenant-governor, or he shall be
unable to attend as president of the senate, the senators shall have power to elect one of their own
members to the office of president of the senate…” 76
In 1984, the New York State Law Revision Commission made several crucial points about the
dangers that resulted from the absence of a mechanism for filling a lieutenant governor
vacancy.77 The Commission observed that a vacancy in this office “could [cause] a lack of
continuity in the administration of State affairs should the Governor be unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his (or her) office.”78 The Commission also noted the analogous federal
model in the 25th Amendment that requires the filling of the office of the vice president by
presidential appointment and confirmation by both houses of Congress. Despite these
observations, the Commission declined to advocate for any legislative action or reform. They
reasoned that the absence of a replacement process had not historically caused serious problems,
noting “there have been only eight instances in which a Lieutenant Governor has permanently
replaced a Governor…”79 Indeed, before Skelos, no sitting governor had ever attempted to fill a
vacancy in the office of their successor. However, the justification that the problem has never
manifested is no longer valid and has not been since before 2009.
The 2009 New York Leadership Crisis occurred over a period of about three months when there
was no acknowledged lieutenant governor. During the crisis, wasteful and destructive political
shenanigans resulted in $2.9 billion of waste. 80 This crisis never would have arisen had there
been a legal mechanism requiring the appointment of a replacement lieutenant governor. And,
because such a mechanism still does not exist, the possibility of another, similar crisis looms.
What finally resolved the 2009 crisis was the Court of Appeal’s decision in Skelos, which held
74
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that Governor David Paterson’s appointment of Richard Ravitch as lieutenant governor was
constitutional. Although the court upheld the legality of unilateral replacement by the governor,
that approach to filling lieutenant governor vacancies is flawed.
The Court in Skelos held that Public Officers Law 43 could be utilized by the governor to
appoint a lieutenant governor in the event of a vacancy in that office. 81 This was the
interpretation advanced by the governor’s counsel as a means of moving forward from the
ongoing gridlock crisis. Public Officers Law 43 is one of three statutes born of Section XIII of
the New York Constitution which provides that “[t]he legislature shall provide for filling
vacancies in office.”82 The other two statutes, §§ 41 and 42, pertain specifically to vacancies in
the offices of attorney general and comptroller. Public Officers Law 43 does not approximate
any such specificity; it does not mention the office of lieutenant governor. Instead, the statute
applies to “Filling other vacancies” and functions thus as a catchall provision that allows the
governor to appoint individuals to offices that are not covered by any other law.
2. The Next Step in a Historical Progression
This catchall statute allowing for the unilateral appointment of a lieutenant governor is
insufficient for three fundamental reasons. First, it runs counter to the elective principle: no other
branch of the state government is involved in the appointment process. And, in some cases, the
governor could be an individual who was not elected for the position by the people of the state.
Second, the 45-word statute does not impose any deadline for appointment and therefore creates
the possibility of significant delay. As the state witnessed in 2009, delay can result in massive
waste and political chaos. 83 Finally, this process should be outlined by constitutional amendment
instead of a statute. Patrick Woods, an essential scholar on this topic, argues that an amendment
is preferable given the controversy, division, and confusion that can result from the
circumstances prompting succession. 84 Woods asserts that a statute is too vulnerable to political
manipulation and even erasure. A constitutional provision, on the other hand, is sufficiently
protected and permanent to guard against the chaos and malice of a political crisis.
The time is right to use the stepping stone of Skelos to move to a more deliberate and
democratically sound mechanism for the replacement of a lieutenant governor. This mechanism
must carry forward the lessons learned from the 2009 crisis, preserve the elective principle, allow
for unity in the executive, and minimize or perhaps eliminate gaps and delays in the transfer of
power. Thirty states already have explicit processes for filling lieutenant governor vacancies. 85 A
majority of those states utilize an appointment process, and many of those states have made
strides to preserve the elective principle by placing a check on the governor’s power by requiring
confirmation by state legislatures.86 It is time for New York to join these states. The two
proposals for reform that the Clinic finds particularly appealing would be a vast improvement on
the current system.
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3. The Alaska-Woods Model
Woods’ 2013 article cites the 2009 Leadership Crisis as proof that the state needs a process that
minimizes delay. Woods rejects special elections for choosing replacement lieutenant governors
because they are notoriously slow. Even appointment upon vacancy is viewed by Woods as
allowing for too much delay. Woods therefore proposes a modified system of automatic
succession modeled on an Alaskan statute. 87 This system would require the governor to select a
successor lieutenant governor from a limited pool of officials within a set period of time after
assuming office (20 days in Alaska). The pool includes “the elected attorney general, the elected
comptroller, the most recently elected temporary president of the senate, and the most recently
elected speaker of the assembly.”88 This bounded range of potential successors emphasizes the
elective principle and mitigates the arbitrary nature of the appointment. Along with this addition
to the Alaska statute, Woods removes the requirement for confirmation from the legislature.
The Alaska-Woods Model tends to nearly every concern outlined above. It preserves the elective
principle by mandating not only that the recently elected governor make the appointment but that
he or she choose a successor lieutenant governor from a group of elected officials. It allows for
unity in the executive by giving the governor a freedom of choice in this appointment. And it
almost completely avoids delay by setting a deadline for appointment.
4. The Federal Model
Another model of appointment and confirmation is the federal approach in the U.S.
Constitution’s 25th Amendment.89 If this model were applied to New York, the governor would
be required to fill a vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor with approval from majorities of
both houses of the Legislature. Professor Jerry Goldfeder stresses the importance of the check on
the governor’s appointment via approval from the legislative branch. This check would support
the elective principle as the legislature represents the people.
The Federal Model rejects unilateral appointment by the governor as excessive. Scandal
associated with an impeached or resigning governor might taint a lieutenant governor who the
governor had appointed without any check. At the same time, the Federal Model’s approach of
waiting for a vacancy to occur before activating the appointment mechanism defeats the purpose
of the solution and does not get us far enough from the crisis of 2009. 90 Had the Federal Model’s
provisions for confirmation been in place at the time of that crisis, the disastrous gridlock still
could have occurred for nothing about the model of checks and balances on its own promotes the
expediency required to mitigate delay.
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5. The Hybrid Model
New York should implement a process that draws on both the Alaska-Woods and Federal
Models.91 It should both eliminate wasteful delay by demanding that a newly-elected governor
appoint a prospective successor to the lieutenant governor’s office and require the incorporation
of multiple branches of government by requiring confirmation of the governor’s choice from
both houses of the Legislature at the outset of the new governor’s term.
Capturing Woods’ modifications providing for a set deadline and a limited range of appointees
while restoring the original Alaska statute’s confirmation requirement would effectively sync the
Alaska-Woods Model and the Federal Model, extract the most valuable elements from both, and
preserve the elective principle without sacrificing expediency or the unity of the executive. Until
such a mechanism is in place, New York State awaits another crisis of democratic leadership.
IV. Line of Succession
All of the New York State constitutions since 1777 have made the temporary president of the
Senate the next successor to the governorship after the lieutenant governor. 92 The 1894
constitution extended the line of succession to include the speaker of the Assembly after the
temporary president of the Senate. 93 These are the only successors identified in the current
constitution. In the event of a dual vacancy, inability, or absence from the state in the offices of
governor and lieutenant governor, the temporary president would serve as acting governor until
the governor or lieutenant governor became available or until a new governor was elected.94 If
there is no temporary president at the time of a dual vacancy, the speaker would serve as acting
governor.95
The constitution delegates authority to the Legislature to extend the line of succession beyond
the speaker. In 1951, the Legislature exercised this authority, passing the Defense Emergency
Act of 1951. Article 1-A, § 5 of the Act provides for further succession if, as a result of an
emergency, “the office of governor becomes vacant and each, the Lieutenant Governor, the
Temporary President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the Assembly is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of governor.”96 The Act named eight officials to succeed to the
governorship after the speaker in the following order: the attorney general, comptroller,
commissioner of transportation, commissioner of health, commissioner of commerce, industrial
commissioner (now, the commissioner of labor), chairman of the public service commission, and
secretary of state. These officials serve as acting governor until the election or the qualification
of the governor, lieutenant governor, temporary president of the Senate, or speaker of the
Assembly.97
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The current line of succession is flawed. The provisions contain ambiguities and raise concerns
about separation of powers, continuity of government, and democratic legitimacy. This section
explores those concerns and recommends reforms.
A. Resignation Requirement
The New York constitution is not clear on whether the temporary president or speaker must
vacate their offices before acting as governor. Article III, § 7 requires resignation when
lawmakers take some positions, but it does not expressly mention the position of acting
governor:
If a member of the legislature be elected to congress, or appointed to any office,
civil or military, under the government of the United States, the state of New York,
or under any city government except as a member of the national guard or naval
militia of the state, or of the reserve forces of the United States, his or her
acceptance thereof shall vacate his or her seat in the legislature, providing,
however, that a member of the legislature may be appointed commissioner of deeds
or to any office in which he or she shall receive no compensation. 98
It is not clear whether this section prevents the temporary president or speaker from succeeding
to the governorship without first resigning from their legislative posts. And no statutory
provision exists that prohibits them from simultaneously holding their legislative offices and
serving as acting governor. A careful review of the scholarship and legislative history concerning
gubernatorial succession provisions provide no answers. However, there is case law that
addresses “incompatible offices.” Generally, a person may hold two offices at the same time
unless there is some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary or unless the offices are
incompatible.99 The presidential line of succession statute requires successors to resign from
their offices before discharging the powers of the presidency.100
For present purposes, assume that Article III, § 7 prohibits both the temporary president and
speaker from acting as governor before vacating their legislative offices. If there is a dual
vacancy in the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, a temporary president acting as
governor must be prepared to cede executive responsibilities back to either the governor or
lieutenant once the vacancies or inabilities have ended. If the temporary president was forced to
resign from their legislative office, they would be left without an office once the governor or
98
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lieutenant governor returns to their office. And if another person had been elected to the prior
position, the chances of regaining it may be slim. Accordingly, lawmakers could be discouraged
from serving as acting governor.
1. Source of Authority to Act as Governor
If the temporary president of the Senate acts as governor—either temporarily or for the
remainder of the term—and then another temporary president is elected, it is unclear whether
gubernatorial power shifts to the newly elected temporary president. Does the power of the
governor then shift hands to the new temporary Senate president? 101 Some courts in other states
have held that the power shifts to the new temporary president because the power to act as
governor is tied to the office, not the person. 102 In other words, if the temporary president resigns
their office, their tenure as acting governor would end instantaneously because gubernatorial
succession powers are tied to the office of temporary president, not the person who serves in the
position—the moment the temporary president resigns they become a private citizen without
entitlement to the governorship.
Though this concept has a certain appeal, it is impractical. Recall Article IV, Section 5 of the
constitution, and, this time, imagine that the lieutenant governor replaces the governor from
office and then a new lieutenant governor is appointed or elected. Taken to its logical
consequence, the “power tied to the office” view would suggest that the newly-appointed or
elected lieutenant governor is actually the proper governor because the lieutenant governor’s
office is the source of the authority to act as governor. Clearly, this is untenable. The ambiguity
about the source of the acting governor’s authority could lead to instability in the leadership of
the executive branch and raise questions about the acting governor’s legitimacy.
B. Separation of Powers
Placing legislators in the line of succession for executive positions creates separation of powers
issues. The New York constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, provides for a distribution of
powers among three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. 103 This
distribution is designed to avoid excessive concentration of power in any one branch or
individual. While the framers of the New York constitution took great steps to separate
government power across the different branches, they took only limited steps to prevent
particular individuals from amassing excessive power by jointly holding offices in more than one
branch of government at the same time. Indeed, the constitution seems to allow the temporary
president of the Senate or speaker of the Assembly to hold offices in the executive and legislative
branches concurrently.
101
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If the temporary president is not required to resign from the Legislature before assumption of the
governorship, upon succession, they would hold two incompatible offices simultaneously. This
would affect the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches and would
give too much power to the temporary president, even if perhaps for a brief moment. They would
be at once entitled to cast the tie-breaking vote and take part in legislative debates, while also
being entitled to approve or veto bills and convene the legislature.
Moreover, in the event that the Legislature considers articles of impeachment against the
temporary president as acting governor, although he would not be allowed to preside over such
proceedings, there would be a significant appearance of bias.104 It would be hard to imagine a
more glaring conflict of interest than where the Legislature would have to impeach and convict
one of its members.
C. Party Continuity and Democratic Legitimacy
The New York State constitution vests in the lieutenant governor the power to preside over the
Senate, but to ensure no interruption in the continuity of government, the constitution requires
the Senate to elect a temporary president to guide the business of the Senate during the lieutenant
governor’s absence from the chamber. 105 The temporary president is elected by voters from one
of the many districts throughout the state, rather than chosen in a statewide election. In like
manner, the constitution requires the Assembly to elect from among its membership a speaker to
preside over the Assembly. 106 The speaker is an independently elected official who represents
her district and serves as an Assembly member for two-year terms in the lower house of the
legislature.107
The presence of the temporary president and speaker in the line of succession creates the
possibility of a change of party control in the governorship. There could be a takeover by the
opposition party without it having to win the governor’s office in a statewide election because
the temporary president or speaker may not be of the same political party as the governor. A
change in party leadership could undermine the will of the voters.
But even if the temporary president (or speaker) and governor are from the same party, elevating
them to the governorship may lack democratic legitimacy because neither the speaker nor
temporary president are elected by a statewide electorate. The smaller share of voters that elected
them cannot give these lawmakers as legitimate a claim to the governorship as would a statewide
election.
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D. Proposals for Reform
While the issue as to whether a legislator ascending to the governorship must resign from their
legislative office has never been a cause of controversy in New York, the state cannot go on
without addressing it. In 2009, the state came close to confronting this issue during the
leadership crisis, and the prospect was raised again with the resignation of Lieutenant Governor
Brian Benjamin. To avoid many of the above-mentioned problems, New York State should
amend Article III, § 7 of the constitution to clarify that a temporary president or speaker
ascending to act as governor must vacate their office before acting as governor. Even if their
succession to the governorship can be expected to be temporary, they should be required to
vacate their legislative posts before acting. This must also be done to avoid the possibility of
holding incompatible offices.
Generally, two offices are incompatible if there is an inconsistency between their functions, or if
one office is subordinate to the other. 108 Put differently, if one official has the power to appoint
or remove the other, or has the right to interfere in any way with the performance of the duties of
the other, the two offices should be regarded as incompatible. 109 When the temporary president
or speaker acts as governor, they would be holding two incompatible offices, because they would
have the ability to interfere with the business of the executive and legislative branches. As such,
both the temporary president and speaker should be required to resign their legislative offices
before ascending to the governorship to act as governor. Additionally, the constitution should be
amended to clarify that an official’s entitlement to serve as acting governor is not based on the
official concurrently holding their prior legislative office. This would remove the existing
ambiguity regarding the source of an acting governor’s authority.
While we recognize the value of party continuity and democratic legitimacy, we do not
recommend removing the temporary president or speaker from the line of succession in order to
prevent a possible change in party control of the governorship. That both officials are elected and
then chosen as leaders by their respective chambers of the Legislature provides an important
measure of democratic legitimacy. The same cannot be said for many of the other successors in
the line who are appointed, rather than elected.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Sample Gubernatorial Inability Provision
Whenever the governor transmits to the chief judge of the Court of Appeals a written declaration
that they are unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, and until they transmit to
the chief judge a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the lieutenant governor as acting governor.
Whenever at least six of the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the comptroller, the
temporary president of the Senate, the speaker of the Assembly, and the minority leaders of the
Senate and the Assembly submit to the chief judge of the Court of Appeals written declaration
that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the lieutenant
governor shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as acting governor.
Thereafter, when the governor transmits to the temporary president of the senate and the speaker
of the assembly their written declaration that no disability exists, the governor shall resume the
powers and duties of the office of governor, unless a majority of the lieutenant governor, the
attorney general, the chief judge of the court of appeals, the temporary president of the senate,
and the speaker of the assembly submit to the secretary of state a written declaration to the
contrary.
Thereafter, following notice and hearing, the judges of the Court of Appeals shall render such
judgment as they find warranted by a preponderance of the evidence. If a majority of the court of
appeals holds that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office of
governor, the lieutenant governor shall continue to act as governor until such time as the
disability of the governor is removed or a newly elected governor is inaugurated. Such disability,
once determined by the court of appeals, may be removed upon petition for declaratory judgment
to the court of appeals by the governor if the court finds, after notice and hearing, by a
preponderance of the evidence that the governor is able to discharge the powers and duties of the
office of governor.
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Appendix B: Survey of State Gubernatorial Succession Provisions
Alabama
ALA. CONST. art. V, § 128
If the governor or other officer administering the office shall appear to be of unsound mind, it shall be the duty of
the supreme court of Alabama, at any regular term, or at any special term, which it is hereby authorized to call for
that purpose, upon request in writing, verified by their affidavits, of any two of the officers named in section 127
of this Constitution, not next in succession to the office of governor, to ascertain the mental condition of the
governor or other officer administering the office, and if he is adjudged to be of unsound mind, to so decree, a
copy of which decree, duly certified, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state; and in the event of such
adjudication, it shall be the duty of the officer next in succession to perform the duties of the office until the
governor or other officer administering the office is restored to his mind. If the incumbent denies that the
governor or other person entitled to administer the office has been restored to his mind, the supreme court, at the
instance of any officer named in section 127 of this Constitution, shall ascertain the truth concerning the same,
and if the officer has been restored to his mind, shall so adjudge and file a duly certified copy of its decree with
the secretary of state; and in the event of such adjudication, the office shall be restored to him. The supreme court
shall prescribe the method of taking testimony and the rules of practice in such proceedings, which rules shall
include a provision for the service of notice of such proceedings on the governor or person acting as governor.

Alaska
ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 12
Whenever for a period of six months, a governor has been continuously absent from office or has been unable to
discharge the duties of his office by reason of mental or physical disability, the offices shall be deemed vacant.
The procedure for determining absence and disability shall be prescribed by law.

Arizona
ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 6
In the event of ... permanent disability to discharge the duties of the office, the secretary of state, if holding by
election, shall succeed to the office of governor until his successor shall be elected and shall qualify[, then] the
attorney general, the state treasurer, or the superintendent of public instruction, if holding by election, shall, in the
order named, succeed to the office of governor. ... Any successor to the office shall become governor in fact and
entitled to all of the emoluments, powers and duties of governor upon taking the oath of office. In the event of ...
temporary disability to discharge the duties of the office, the powers and duties of the office of governor shall
devolve upon the same person as in case of vacancy, but only until the disability ceases.

Arkansas
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 12
In case of the death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify, resignation, absence from the State, or other
disability of the Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office for the remainder of the term, or until
the disability be removed ... shall devolve upon, and accrue, to the President of the Senate

California
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10
... The Lieutenant shall act as governor during ... temporary disability of the Governor or of a Governor-elect who
fails to take office.
The Legislature shall provide an order of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor for succession to the office of
Governor and for the temporary exercise of the Governor’s functions.
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this section.
Standing to raise questions of vacancy or temporary disability is vested exclusively in a body provided by statute.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12070
There is in the state government a Commission on the Governorship, consisting of the President pro Tempore of
the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, the President of the University of California, the Chancellor of the
California State Colleges, and the Director of Finance.
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Colorado
COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 13(5)
In the event the governor or lieutenant governor ... is absent from the state or suffering from a physical or mental
disability, the powers and duties of the office of governor and the office of lieutenant governor shall, until the
absence or disability ceases, temporarily devolve upon the lieutenant governor, ... except that if the lieutenant
governor and none of said members of the general assembly are affiliated with the same political party, the
temporary vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor shall be filled by the first named member in said
subsection (7)....
COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 13(6)
The governor or governor-elect, lieutenant governor or lieutenant governor-elect, or person acting as governor or
lieutenant governor may transmit to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives his
written declaration that he suffers from a physical or mental disability and he is unable to properly discharge the
powers and duties of the office of governor or lieutenant governor. In the event no such written declaration has
been made, his physical or mental disability shall be determined by a majority of the supreme court after a
hearing held pursuant to a joint request submitted by joint resolution adopted by two thirds of all members of
each house of the general assembly. Such determination shall be final and conclusive. The supreme court, upon
its own initiative, shall determine if and when such disability ceases.

Connecticut
CONN. CONST. amend. art. XXII(d)
In the absence of a written declaration of incapacity by the governor, whenever the lieutenant-governor or a
majority of the members of the Council on Gubernatorial Incapacity transmits to the Council … a written
declaration … the Council shall convene … to determine if the governor is unable to exercise the powers and
perform the duties of his office. If the Council ... determines by two-thirds vote that the governor is unable to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office, it shall transmit a written declaration to that effect to the
president pro tempore of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives and to the lieutenantgovernor and the lieutenant-governor, upon receipt of such declaration, shall exercise the powers and authority
and discharge the duties appertaining to the office of the governor as acting governor; otherwise, the governor
shall continue to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of his office. Upon receipt by the president pro
tempore of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives of such a written declaration from the
Council, the General Assembly shall, in accordance with its rules, decide the issue, assembling ... for that purpose
if not in session. If the General Assembly ... determines by two-thirds vote of each house that the governor is
unable to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of his office, the lieutenant-governor shall continue to
exercise the powers and authority and perform the duties appertaining to the office of governor; otherwise, the
governor shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Delaware
DEL. CONST. art. III, § 20
(a) In case [of] inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Lieutenant-Governor ... until the disability of the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor is removed, or a Governor
shall be duly elected and qualified. ...
(b) Whenever the Governor transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his or her written declaration that he or she is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his or
her office, and until he or she transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Lieutenant Governor as Acting Governor.
Whenever the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the President of the Medical Society of Delaware
and the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, acting unanimously, transmit to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the
Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his or her office because of mental or physical
disability, the Lieutenant Governor shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
Governor.
Thereafter, when the Governor transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his or her written declaration that no disability exists, he or she shall resume the powers and
duties of his or her office unless the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, the President of the Medical
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Society of Delaware and the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, acting unanimously, transmit
within five days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his or her office because of
mental or physical disability. Thereupon the General Assembly shall decide the issue, assembling within seventytwo hours for that purpose if not then in session. If the General Assembly within ten days after receipt of the latter
written declaration determines by two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each house that the Governor is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his or her office because of mental or physical disability, the
Lieutenant Governor shall continue to discharge same as Acting Governor; otherwise, the Governor shall resume
the powers and duties of his or her office.

Florida
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3
(a) Upon vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor shall become governor. Further succession to
the office of governor shall be prescribed by law. A successor shall serve for the remainder of the term.
(b) Upon impeachment of the governor and until completion of trial thereof, or during the governor’s physical or
mental incapacity, the lieutenant governor shall act as governor. Further succession as acting governor shall be
prescribed by law. Incapacity to serve as governor may be determined by the supreme court upon due notice after
docketing of a written suggestion thereof by three cabinet members, and in such case restoration of capacity shall
be similarly determined after docketing of written suggestion thereof by the governor, the legislature or three
cabinet members. Incapacity to serve as governor may also be established by certificate filed with the custodian
of state records by the governor declaring incapacity for physical reasons to serve as governor, and in such case
restoration of capacity shall be similarly established.

Georgia
GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 5
(a) In case of the temporary disability of the Governor as determined in the manner provided in Section IV of this
article, the Lieutenant Governor shall exercise the powers and duties of the Governor and receive the same
compensation as the Governor until such time as the temporary disability of the Governor ends.
(b) In case of the death, resignation, or permanent disability of the Governor or the Governor-elect, the Lieutenant
Governor or the Lieutenant Governor-elect, upon becoming the Lieutenant Governor, shall become the Governor
until a successor shall be elected and qualified as hereinafter provided. A successor to serve for the unexpired
term shall be elected at the next general election; but, if such death, resignation, or permanent disability shall
occur within 30 days of the next general election or if the term will expire within 90 days after the next general
election, the Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor for the unexpired term. No person shall be elected or
appointed to the office of Lieutenant Governor for the unexpired term in the event the Lieutenant Governor shall
become Governor as herein provided.
(c) In case of the death, resignation, or permanent disability of both the Governor or the Governor-elect and the
Lieutenant Governor or the Lieutenant Governor-elect or in case of the death, resignation, or permanent disability
of the Governor and there shall be no Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
exercise the powers and duties of the Governor until the election and qualification of a Governor at a special
election, which shall be held within 90 days from the date on which the Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall have assumed the powers and duties of the Governor, and the person elected shall serve out the unexpired
term
GA. CONST. art. V, § 4
(1) ‘Elected constitutional executive officer,’ how defined. As used in this section, the term ‘elected constitutional
executive officer’ means the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the
State School Superintendent, the Commissioner of Insurance, the Commissioner of Agriculture, and the
Commissioner of Labor.
(2) Procedure for determining disability. Upon a petition of any four of the elected constitutional executive
officers to the Supreme Court of Georgia that another elected constitutional executive officer is unable to perform
the duties of office because of a physical or mental disability, the Supreme Court shall by appropriate rule
provide for a speedy and public hearing on such matter, including notice of the nature and cause of the
accusation, process for obtaining witnesses, and the assistance of counsel. Evidence at such hearing shall include
testimony from not fewer than three qualified physicians in private practice, one of whom must be a psychiatrist.
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(3) Effect of determination of disability. If, after hearing the evidence on disability, the Supreme Court determines
that there is a disability and that such disability is permanent, the office shall be declared vacant and the successor
to that office shall be chosen as provided in this Constitution or the laws enacted in pursuance thereof. If it is
determined that the disability is not permanent, the Supreme Court shall determine when the disability has ended
and when the officer shall resume the exercise of the powers of office. During the period of temporary disability,
the powers of such office shall be exercised as provided by law.

Hawaii
HAW. CONST. art. V, § 4
In the event of the absence of the governor from the State, or the governor’s inability to exercise and discharge
the powers and duties of the governor’s office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor
during such absence or disability.
When the office of lieutenant governor is vacant, or in the event of the absence of the lieutenant governor from
the State, or the lieutenant governor’s inability to exercise and discharge the powers and duties of the lieutenant
governor’s office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon such officers in such order of succession as may be
provided by law.
In the event of the impeachment of the governor or of the lieutenant governor, the governor or the lieutenant
governor shall not exercise the powers of the applicable office until acquitted.

Idaho
IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 12
In case of the failure to qualify, the impeachment, or conviction of treason, felony, or other infamous crime of the
governor, or his death, removal from office, resignation, absence from the state, or inability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office for the residue of the term, or
until the disability shall cease, shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor.
IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 14
In case of the failure to qualify in his office, death, resignation, absence from the state, impeachment, conviction
of treason, felony or other infamous crime, or disqualification from any cause, of both governor and lieutenant
governor, the duties of the governor shall devolve upon the president of the senate pro tempore, until such
disqualification of either the governor or lieutenant governor be removed, or the vacancy filled; and if the
president of the senate, for any of the above named causes, shall become incapable of performing the duties of
governor, the same shall devolve upon the speaker of the house.

Illinois
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 6
(b) If the Governor is unable to serve because of death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify, resignation
or other disability, the office of Governor shall be filled by the officer next in line of succession for the remainder
of the term or until the disability is removed.
(c) Whenever the Governor determines that he may be seriously impeded in the exercise of his powers, he shall
so notify the Secretary of State and the officer next in line of succession. The latter shall thereafter become
Acting Governor with the duties and powers of Governor. When the Governor is prepared to resume office, he
shall do so by notifying the Secretary of State and the Acting Governor.
(d) The General Assembly by law shall specify by whom and by what procedures the ability of the Governor to
serve or to resume office may be questioned and determined. The Supreme Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to review such a law and any such determination and, in the absence of such a law, shall
make the determination under such rules as it may adopt.

Indiana
IND. CONST. art. V, § 10(c)
Whenever the Governor transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives the Governor’s written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of the office, and until the Governor transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Lieutenant Governor as Acting Governor. Thereafter, when the Governor
transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the
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Governor’s written declaration that no inability exists, the Governor shall resume the powers and duties of the
office.
IND. CONST. art. V, § 10(d)
Whenever the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives file with the
Supreme Court a written statement suggesting that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Supreme Court shall meet within forty-eight hours to decide the question and such decision shall
be final. Thereafter, whenever the Governor files with the Supreme Court the Governor’s written declaration that
no inability exists, the Supreme Court shall meet within forty-eight hours to decide whether such be the case and
such decision shall be final. Upon a decision that no inability exists, the Governor shall resume the powers and
duties of the office.

Iowa
IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 17
In the case of the death, impeachment, resignation, removal from office, or other disability of the governor, the
powers and duties of the office for the residue of the term, or until he shall be acquitted, or the disability removed,
shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor.

Kansas
KAN. CONST. art. I, § 11
In the event of the disability of the governor, the lieutenant governor shall assume the powers and duties of
governor until the disability is removed. The legislature shall provide by law for the succession to the office of
governor should the offices of governor and lieutenant governor be vacant, and for the assumption of the powers
and duties of governor during the disability of the governor, should the office of lieutenant governor be vacant or
the lieutenant governor be disabled. ... The procedure for determining disability and the removal thereof shall be
provided by law.

Kentucky
KY. CONST. art. VI, § 84
Should the Governor be impeached and removed from office, die, refuse to qualify, resign, certify by entry on his
Journal that he is unable to discharge the duties of his office, or be, from any cause, unable to discharge the duties
of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall exercise all the power and authority appertaining to the office of
Governor until another be duly elected and qualified, or the Governor shall be able to discharge the duties of his
office. On the trial of the Governor, the President of the Senate shall not preside over the proceedings, but the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside during the trial.
If the Governor, due to physical or mental incapacitation, is unable to discharge the duties of his office, the
Attorney General may petition the Supreme Court to have the Governor declared disabled. If the Supreme Court
determines in a unanimous decision that the Governor is unable to discharge the duties of his office, the Chief
Justice shall certify such disability to the Secretary of State who shall enter same on the Journal of the Acts of the
Governor, and the Lieutenant Governor shall assume the duties of the Governor, and shall act as Governor until
the Supreme Court determines that the disability of the Governor has ceased to exist. Before the Governor
resumes his duties, the finding of the Court that the disability has ceased shall be certified by the Chief Justice to
the Secretary of State who shall enter such finding on the Journal of the Acts of the Governor.

Louisiana
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 18
(A) Declaration and Counter-Declaration. When a majority of the statewide elected officials determine that any
other such official is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, they shall transmit a written
declaration to this effect to the presiding officer of each house and to the official, and shall file a copy of the
declaration in the office of the secretary of state. Thereafter, the constitutional successor shall assume the office
as acting official unless, within forty-eight hours after the declaration is filed in the office of the secretary of state,
the elected official files in that office and transmits to the presiding officer of each house his written counterdeclaration of his ability to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office.
(B) Determination by the Legislature. The legislature shall convene at noon on the third calendar day after the
filing of any counter-declaration, which may be filed by the official at any time. Should two-thirds of the elected
members of each house fail to adopt a resolution within seventy-two hours declaring probable justification for the
determination that inability exists, the official shall continue in or resume office.
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(C) Assumption of Office by Constitutional Successor. If two-thirds of the elected members of each house adopt a
resolution declaring that probable justification exists for the declaration of inability, the constitutional successor
shall assume the powers and duties of the office and a copy of the resolution shall be transmitted forthwith to the
supreme court.
(D) Determination by Supreme Court. By preference and with priority over all other matters, the supreme court
shall determine the issue of inability after due notice and hearing, by a majority vote of members elected to the
court, under such rules as it may adopt.
(E) Reconsideration by Supreme Court. A judgment of the supreme court affirming inability may be reconsidered
by the court, after due notice and hearing, either upon its own motion or upon the application of the official. Upon
proper showing and by majority vote of its elected members, the court may determine that no inability then exists,
whereupon the official shall immediately resume the powers and duties of his office.

Maine
ME. CONST. art. V, § 14
Mental or physical disability of the Governor continuously for more than 6 months
Whenever for 6 months a Governor in office shall have been continuously unable to discharge the powers and
duties of that office because of mental or physical disability such office shall be deemed vacant. Such vacancy
shall be declared by the Supreme Judicial Court upon presentment to it of a joint resolution declaring the ground
of the vacancy, adopted by a vote of 2/3 of the Senators and Representatives in convention, and upon notice,
hearing before the court and a decision by a majority of the court that ground exists for declaring the office to be
vacant
ME. CONST. art. V, § 15
Temporary Mental or Physical Disability of Governor
Whenever the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of that office because of mental or physical
disability, the President of the Senate, or if that office is vacant, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall exercise the powers and duties of the office of Governor until the Governor is again able to discharge the
powers and duties of that office, or until the office of Governor is declared to be vacant or until another Governor
shall be duly qualified.
Whenever the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of that office, the Governor may so certify
to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, in which case and upon notice from the Chief Justice, the
President of the Senate, or if that office is vacant, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall exercise the
powers and duties of the office of Governor until such time as the Governor shall certify to the Chief Justice that
the Governor is able to discharge such powers and duties and the Chief Justice shall so notify the officer who is
exercising the powers and duties of the office of Governor.
When the Secretary of State shall have reason to believe that the Governor is unable to discharge the duties of
that office, the Secretary of State may so certify to the Supreme Judicial Court, declaring the reason for such
belief. After notice to the Governor, a hearing before the court and a decision by a majority of the court that the
Governor is unable to discharge the duties of the office of Governor, the court shall notify the President of the
Senate, or if that office is vacant the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of such inability and that officer
shall exercise the functions, powers and duties of the office of Governor until such time as the Secretary of State
or the Governor shall certify to the court that the Governor is able to discharge the duties of the office of
Governor and the court, after notice to the Governor and a hearing before the court, decides that the Governor is
able to discharge the duties of that office and so notifies the officer who is exercising the powers and duties of the
office of Governor.
Whenever either the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives shall exercise the office
of Governor, the officer shall receive only the compensation of Governor, but the officer’s duties as President or
Speaker shall be suspended; and the Senate or House shall fill the vacancy resulting from such suspension, until
the officer shall cease to exercise the office of Governor.

Maryland
MD. CONST. art. II, § 6(d)
The General Assembly, by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of all its members in joint session, may adopt a
resolution declaring that the Governor or Lieutenant Governor is unable by reason of physical or mental disability
to perform the duties of the office. When action is undertaken pursuant to this subsection of the Constitution, the

27

officer who concludes that the other officer is unable, by reason of disability to perform the duties of the office
shall have the power to call the General Assembly into Joint Session. The resolution, if adopted, shall be
delivered to the Supreme Court of Maryland, which then shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether
that officer is unable by reason of the disability to perform the duties of the office. If the Supreme Court of
Maryland determines that such officer is unable to discharge the duties of the office by reason of a permanent
disability, the office shall be vacant. If the Supreme Court of Maryland determines that such officer is unable to
discharge the duties of the office by reason of a temporary disability, it shall declare the office to be vacant during
the time of the disability and the Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to determine when the disability has
terminated. If the General Assembly and the Supreme Court of Maryland, acting in the same manner as described
above, determine that the Governor-elect or Lieutenant Governor-elect is unable by reason of physical or mental
disability to perform the duties of the elected office, the elected officer shall be disqualified to assume office.

Massachusetts
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. III
Whenever the chair of the governor shall be vacant, by reason of his death, or absence from the commonwealth,
or otherwise, the lieutenant governor, for the time being, shall, during such vacancy, perform all the duties
incumbent upon the governor, and shall have and exercise all the powers and authorities, which by this
constitution the governor is vested with, when personally present.
MASS. CONST. amend. art. LV
Whenever the offices of governor and lieutenant-governor shall both be vacant, by reason of death, absence from
the commonwealth, or otherwise, then one of the following officers, in the order of succession herein named,
namely, the secretary, attorney-general, treasurer and receiver-general, and auditor, shall, during such vacancy,
have full power and authority to do and execute all and every such acts, matters and things as the governor or the
lieutenant-governor might or could lawfully do or execute, if they, or either of them, were personally present.

Michigan
MICH. CONST. art. V, § 26
Succession to Governorship
In case of the conviction of the governor on impeachment, his removal from office, his resignation or his death,
the lieutenant governor, the elected secretary of state, the elected attorney general and such other persons
designated by law shall in that order be governor for the remainder of the governor’s term.
...
Duration of successor’s term as governor
If the governor or the person in line of succession to serve as governor is absent from the state, or suffering under
an inability, the powers and duties of the office of the governor shall devolve in order of precedence until the
absence or inability giving rise to the devolution of powers ceases.
Determination of inability
The inability of the governor or person acting as governor shall be determined by a majority of the supreme court
on joint request of the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives. Such
determination shall be final and conclusive. The supreme court shall upon its own initiative determine if and
when the inability ceases

Minnesota
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 5
In case a vacancy occurs from any cause whatever in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor shall be
governor during such vacancy. ... The last elected presiding officer of the senate shall become lieutenant governor
in case a vacancy occurs in that office. In case the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the same devolves on the lieutenant governor. The legislature may provide by law for the case of the
removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the governor and lieutenant governor to discharge the duties of
governor and may provide by law for continuity of government in periods of emergency resulting from disasters
caused by enemy attack in this state, including but not limited to, succession to the powers and duties of public
office and change of the seat of government.

Mississippi
MISS. CONST. art. V, § 131
When the office of Governor shall become vacant, by death or otherwise, the Lieutenant Governor shall possess
the powers and discharge the duties of the office. When the Governor shall be absent from the state, or unable,
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from protracted illness, to perform the duties of the office, the Lieutenant Governor shall discharge the duties of
said office until the Governor be able to resume his duties; but if, from disability or otherwise, the Lieutenant
Governor shall be incapable of performing said duties, or if he be absent from the State, the President of the
Senate Pro Tempore shall act in his stead; but if there be no such President, or if he be disqualified by like
disability, or be absent from the state, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall assume the office of
Governor and perform the duties; and in case of the inability of the foregoing officers to discharge the duties of
Governor, the Secretary of State shall convene the Senate to elect a President Pro Tempore. ... Should a doubt
arise as to whether a vacancy has occurred in the office of Governor or as to whether any one of the disabilities
mentioned in this section exists or shall have ended, then the Secretary of State shall submit the question in doubt
to the judges of the Supreme Court, who, or a majority of whom, shall investigate and determine the question and
shall furnish to the Secretary of State an opinion, in writing, determining the question submitted to them, which
opinion, when rendered as aforesaid, shall be final and conclusive.

Missouri
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 11(b)
Whenever the governor transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of
representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
lieutenant governor, ... Whenever a majority of a disability board comprised of the lieutenant governor, the
secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer, the attorney general, president pro tempore of the senate,
the speaker of the house of representatives, the majority floor leader of the senate, and majority floor leader of the
house, transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives their
written declaration that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the lieutenant
governor ... shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as acting governor. Thereafter when the
governor transmits to the disability board his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the
powers and duties of his office on the fourth day after he transmits such declaration unless a majority of the
disability board transmits their written declaration that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office to the supreme court within that four day period, and the supreme court shall then convene to decide
the issue. If the supreme court within twenty-one days after receipt of such declaration, determines by a majority
vote of all members thereof that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the acting
governor shall continue to discharge the same as acting governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the
powers and duties of his office.

Montana
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 14
(4) Whenever, at any other time, the lieutenant governor and attorney general transmit to the legislature their
written declaration that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the legislature
shall convene to determine whether he is able to do so.
(5) If the legislature, within 21 days after convening, determines by two-thirds vote of its members that the
governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the lieutenant governor shall serve as acting
governor. Thereafter, when the governor transmits to the legislature his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office within 15 days, unless the legislature determines otherwise by
two-thirds vote of its members. If the legislature so determines, the lieutenant governor shall continue to serve as
acting governor.

Nebraska
NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 16
... If the Governor or the person in line of succession to serve as Governor is absent from the state, or suffering
under an inability, the powers and duties of the office of Governor shall devolve in order of precedence until the
absence or inability giving rise to the devolution of powers ceases as provided by law.

Nevada
NEV. CONST. art. V, § 18
In case of the impeachment of the Governor, or his removal from Office, death, inability to discharge the duties
of the said Office, resignation or absence from the State, the powers and duties of the Office shall devolve upon
the Lieutenant Governor for the residue of the term, or until the disability shall cease. But when the Governor
shall with the consent of the Legislature be out of the State, in time of War, and at the head of any military force
thereof, he shall continue Commander in Chief of the military forces of the State.
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New Hampshire
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XLIX(a)
Whenever the governor transmits to the secretary of state and president of the senate his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, the president of the senate, for the time being, shall act
as governor as provided in article 49, subject to the succession provisions therein set forth.
…
Whenever it reasonably appears to the attorney general and a majority of the council that the governor is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity, but the governor is
unwilling or unable to transmit his written declaration to such effect as above provided, the attorney general shall
file a petition for declaratory judgment in the supreme court requesting a judicial determination of the ability of
the governor to discharge the powers and duties of his office. After notice and hearing, the justices of the supreme
court shall render such judgment as they find warranted by a preponderance of the evidence; and, if the court
holds that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the president of the senate, for
the time being, shall act as governor as provided in article 49, subject to the succession provisions therein set
forth, until such time as the disability of the governor is removed or a newly elected governor is inaugurated.
Such disability, once determined by the supreme court, may be removed upon petition for declaratory judgment
to the supreme court by the governor if the court finds, after notice and hearing, by a preponderance of the
evidence that the governor is able to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Whenever such disability of
the governor, as determined by his written declaration or by judgment of the supreme court, has continued for a
period of 6 months, the general court may, by concurrent resolution adopted by both houses, declare the office of
governor vacant. Whenever the governor-elect fails to qualify by reason of physical or mental incapacity or any
cause other than death or resignation, for a period of 6 months following the inauguration date established by this
constitution, the general court may, by concurrent resolution adopted by both houses, declare the office of
governor vacant. The provisions of article 49 shall govern the filling of such vacancy, either by special election or
continued service of an acting governor. If the general court is not in session when any such 6-month period
expires, the acting governor, upon written request of at least 1/4 of the members of each house, shall convene the
general court in special session for the sole purpose of considering and acting on the question whether to declare
a vacancy in the office of governor under this article.

New Jersey
N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1(7)
In the event of the failure of the Governor-elect to qualify, or of the absence from the State of a Governor in
office, or the Governor’s inability to discharge the duties of the office, or the Governor’s impeachment, the
functions, powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor, until the
Governor-elect qualifies, or the Governor in office returns to the State, or is no longer unable to discharge the
duties of the office, or is acquitted, as the case may be, or until a new Governor is elected and qualifies. In the
event that the Lieutenant Governor in office is absent from the State, or is unable to discharge the duties of the
office, or is impeached, or if the Lieutenant Governor-elect fails to qualify, or if there is a vacancy in the office of
Lieutenant Governor, the functions, powers, duties, and emoluments of the office of Governor shall devolve upon
the President of the Senate. In the event there is a vacancy in the office of the President of the Senate, or of the
Senate President’s absence from the State, inability to discharge the duties of the office, or impeachment, then
such functions, powers, duties, and emoluments shall devolve upon the Speaker of the General Assembly. In the
event there is a vacancy in the office of Speaker of the General Assembly, or of the Speaker’s absence from the
State, inability to discharge the duties of the office, or impeachment, then such functions, powers, duties, and
emoluments shall devolve upon such officers and in the order of succession as may be provided by law. The
functions, powers, duties, and emoluments of the office of Governor shall devolve upon the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the General Assembly or another officer, as the case may be, until the Governor-elect or
Lieutenant Governor-elect qualifies, or the Governor or Lieutenant Governor in office returns to the State, or is
no longer unable to discharge the duties of the office, or is acquitted, or until a new Lieutenant Governor is
appointed, as the case may be, or a new Governor or Lieutenant Governor is elected and qualifies.

New Mexico
N.M. CONST. art. I, § 7
[I]n case the governor is absent from the state, or is for any reason unable to perform his duties, the lieutenant
governor shall act as governor, with all the powers, duties and emoluments of that office until such disability be
removed. ...
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New York
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5
When Lieutenant-Governor to Act as Governor
In case the governor is impeached, is absent from the state or is otherwise unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office of governor, the lieutenant-governor shall act as governor until the inability shall cease or
until the term of the governor shall expire. ...

North Carolina
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 3
(2) Succession as Acting Governor. During the absence of the Governor from the State, or during the physical or
mental incapacity of the Governor to perform the duties of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall be Acting
Governor. The further order of succession as Acting Governor shall be prescribed by law.
(3) Physical incapacity. The Governor may, by a written statement filed with the Attorney General, declare that
he is physically incapable of performing the duties of his office, and may thereafter in the same manner declare
that he is physically capable of performing the duties of his office.
(4) Mental incapacity. The mental incapacity of the Governor to perform the duties of his office shall be
determined only by joint resolution adopted by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of each house of the
General Assembly. Thereafter, the mental capacity of the Governor to perform the duties of his office shall be
determined only by joint resolution adopted by a vote of a majority of all the members of each house of the
General Assembly. In all cases, the General Assembly shall give the Governor such notice as it may deem proper
and shall allow him an opportunity to be heard before a joint session of the General Assembly before it takes final
action. When the General Assembly is not in session, the Council of State, a majority of its members concurring,
may convene it in extra session for the purpose of proceeding under this paragraph.
(5) Impeachment. Removal of the Governor from office for any other cause shall be by impeachment.

North Dakota
N.D. CONST. art. V, § 11
The lieutenant governor shall succeed to the office of governor when a vacancy occurs in the office of governor.
If, during a vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor is unable to serve because of death,
impeachment, resignation, failure to qualify, removal from office, or disability, the secretary of state shall act as
governor until the vacancy is filled or the disability removed.

Ohio
OHIO CONST. art. III, § 15
(B) When the governor is unable to discharge the duties of office by reason of disability, the lieutenant governor
shall serve as governor until the governor’s disability terminates.

Oklahoma
OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 15
In case of impeachment of the Governor, or of his death, failure to qualify, resignation, removal from the State, or
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the said office, with its compensation, shall devolve
upon the Lieutenant Governor for the residue of the term or until the disability shall be removed.

Oregon
OR. CONST. art. V, § 8(a)
In case of the removal from office of the Governor, or of his death, resignation, or disability to discharge the
duties of his office as prescribed by law, the Secretary of State ... shall become Governor until the disability be
removed, or a Governor be elected at the next general biennial election. The Governor elected to fill the vacancy
shall hold office for the unexpired term of the outgoing Governor. The Secretary of State or the State Treasurer
shall appoint a person to fill his office until the election of a Governor, at which time the office so filled by
appointment shall be filled by election; or, in the event of a disability of the Governor, to be Acting Secretary of
State or Acting State Treasurer until the disability be removed. The person so appointed shall not be eligible to
succeed to the office of Governor by automatic succession under this section during the term of his appointment.
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Pennsylvania
PA. CONST. art. IV, § 13
In the case of the death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify or resignation of the Governor, the
Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor for the remainder of the term and in the case of the disability of the
Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor until the
disability is removed.

Rhode Island
R.I. CONST. art IX, § 9
If the office of the governor shall be vacant by reason of death, resignation, impeachment or inability to serve, the
lieutenant governor shall fill the office of governor, and exercise the powers and authority appertaining thereto,
until a governor is qualified to act, or until the office is filled at the next election.

South Carolina
S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 11
In the case of the removal of the Governor from office by impeachment, death, resignation, disqualification,
disability, or removal from the State, the Lieutenant Governor shall be Governor. In case the Governor be
impeached, the Lieutenant Governor shall act in his stead and have his powers until judgment in the case shall
have been pronounced. In the case of the temporary disability of the Governor and in the event of the temporary
absence of the Governor from the State, the Lieutenant Governor shall have full authority to act in an emergency.
In the case of the removal of the Lieutenant Governor from office by impeachment, death, resignation,
disqualification, disability, or removal from the State, the Governor shall appoint, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, a successor to fulfill the unexpired term.
S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12
(1) Whenever the Governor transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Lieutenant Governor as acting Governor.
(2) Whenever a majority of the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Comptroller General and the State
Treasurer, or of such other body as the General Assembly may provide, transmits to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall forthwith assume the powers and duties of the
office as acting Governor.
Thereafter, if the Governor transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no such inability exists he shall forthwith resume the powers and
duties of his office unless a majority of the above members or of such other body, whichever the case may be,
transmits within four days to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon, the
General Assembly shall forthwith consider and decide the issue, and if not in session it shall assemble within
forty-eight hours for the sole purpose of deciding such issue. If the General Assembly, within twenty-one days,
excluding Sundays, after the first day it meets to decide the issue, determines by two-thirds vote of each House
that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall
continue to discharge the same as acting Governor; otherwise, the Governor shall resume the powers and duties
of his office.

South Dakota
S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 6
When the office of Governor shall become vacant through death, resignation, failure to qualify, conviction after
impeachment or permanent disability of the Governor, the lieutenant governor shall succeed to the office and
powers of the Governor. When the Governor is unable to serve by reason of continuous absence from the state, or
other temporary disability, the executive power shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for the residue of the
term or until the disability is removed.
Whenever there is a permanent vacancy in the office of the lieutenant governor, the Governor shall nominate a
lieutenant governor who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the members of each house
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of the Legislature. Whenever there is a concurrent vacancy in the office of Governor and lieutenant governor, the
order of succession for the office of Governor shall be as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine when a continuous absence from
the state or disability has occurred in the office of the Governor or a permanent vacancy exists in the office of
lieutenant governor.

Tennessee
TENN. CONST. art. III, § 12
In case of the removal of the governor from office, or of his death, or resignation, the powers and duties of the
office shall devolve on the speaker of the Senate; and in case of the death, removal from office, or resignation of
the speaker of the Senate, the powers and duties of the office shall devolve on the speaker of the House of
Representatives.

Texas
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 16
(c) In the case of the temporary inability or temporary disqualification of the Governor to serve, the impeachment
of the Governor, or the absence of the Governor from the State, the Lieutenant Governor shall exercise the
powers and authority appertaining to the office of Governor until the Governor becomes able or qualified to
resume serving, is acquitted, or returns to the State.
(d) If the Governor refuses to serve or becomes permanently unable to serve, or if the office of Governor becomes
vacant, the Lieutenant Governor becomes Governor for the remainder of the term being served by the Governor
who refused or became unable to serve or vacated the office. On becoming Governor, the person vacates the
office of Lieutenant Governor, and the resulting vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor shall be filled in
the manner provided by Section 9, Article III, of this Constitution.

Utah
UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 11
(1) A vacancy in the office of Governor occurs when:
(a) the Governor dies, resigns, is removed from office following impeachment, ceases to reside within the state,
or is determined, as provided in Subsection (6), to have a disability that renders the Governor unable to discharge
the duties of office for the remainder of the Governor's term of office; or
(b) the Governor-elect fails to take office because of the Governor-elect's death, failure to qualify for office, or
disability, determined as provided in Subsection (6), that renders the Governor-elect unable to discharge the
duties of office for the Governor-elect's full term of office.
(2) If a vacancy in the office of Governor occurs, the Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor, to serve:
(a) until the first Monday in January of the year following the next regular general election after the vacancy
occurs, if the vacancy occurs during the first year of the term of office; or
(b) for the remainder of the unexpired term, if the vacancy occurs after the first year of the term of office.
(3) (a) In the event of simultaneous vacancies in the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, the President
of the Senate shall become Governor, to serve:
(i) until the first Monday in January of the year following the next regular general election after the vacancy
occurs, if the vacancy occurs during the first year of the term of office; or
(ii) for the remainder of the unexpired term, if the vacancy occurs after the first year of the term of office.
(b) In the event of simultaneous vacancies in the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall become Governor, to serve:
(i) until the first Monday in January of the year following the next regular general election after the vacancy
occurs, if the vacancy occurs during the first year of the term of office; or
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(ii) for the remainder of the unexpired term, if the vacancy occurs after the first year of the term of office.
(4) If a vacancy in the office of Governor occurs during the first year of the term of office, an election shall be
held at the next regular general election after the vacancy occurs to elect a Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as
provided in Article VII, Section 2, to serve the remainder of the unexpired term.
(5) (a) If the Governor is temporarily unable to discharge the duties of the office because of the Governor’s
temporary disability, as determined under Subsection (6), or if the Governor-elect is temporarily unable to
assume the office of Governor because of the Governor-elect’s temporary disability, as determined under
Subsection (6), the powers and duties of the Governor shall be discharged by the Lieutenant Governor who, in
addition to discharging the duties of the office of Lieutenant Governor, shall, without additional compensation,
act as Governor until the disability ceases.
(b) (i) If, during a temporary disability of the Governor or Governor-elect, as determined under Subsection (6), a
vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor occurs or the Lieutenant Governor is temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of the office of Governor because of the Lieutenant Governor’s temporary disability, as
determined under Subsection (6), the powers and duties of the Governor shall be discharged by the President of
the Senate who shall act as Governor until the Governor or Governor-elect’s disability ceases or, in the case of
the Lieutenant Governor's temporary disability, the Lieutenant Governor's disability ceases, whichever occurs
first.
(ii) If, during a temporary disability of the Governor or Governor-elect, as determined under Subsection (6),
neither the Lieutenant Governor nor the President of the Senate is able to discharge the duties of the office of
Governor because of a vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor or President of the Senate, or both, or
because of a temporary disability of either or both officers, as determined under Subsection (6), or a combination
of vacancy and temporary disability, the powers and duties of the Governor shall be discharged by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives who shall act as Governor until the Governor's disability ceases or until the
vacancy, if applicable, in the office of President of the Senate is filled or the temporary disability, if applicable, of
the Lieutenant Governor or President of the Senate ceases, whichever occurs first.
(c) (i) During the time that the President of the Senate acts as Governor under this Subsection (5), the President
may not exercise the powers and duties of President of the Senate or Senator. The powers and duties of President
of the Senate may be exercised during that time by an acting President, chosen by the Senate.
(ii) During the time that the Speaker of the House of Representatives acts as Governor under this Subsection (5),
the Speaker may not exercise the powers and duties of Speaker of the House of Representatives or
Representative. The powers and duties of Speaker of the House of Representatives may be exercised during that
time by an acting Speaker, chosen by the House of Representatives.
(d) When acting as Governor under this Subsection (5), the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, shall be entitled to receive the salary and emoluments of the office of
Governor.
(6) (a) A disability of the Governor, Governor-elect, or person acting as Governor shall be determined by:
(i) the written declaration of the Governor, Governor-elect, or person acting as Governor, transmitted to the
Supreme Court, stating an inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office; or
(ii) a majority of the Supreme Court upon the joint request of the President or, if applicable, acting President of
the Senate and the Speaker or, if applicable, acting Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(b) The Governor or person acting as Governor shall resume or, in the case of a Governor-elect, shall assume the
powers and duties of the office following a temporary disability upon the written declaration of the Governor,
Governor-elect, or person acting as Governor, transmitted to the Supreme Court, that no disability exists, unless
the Supreme Court, upon the joint request of the President or, if applicable, acting President of the Senate and the
Speaker or, if applicable, acting Speaker of the House of Representatives, or upon its own initiative, determines
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that the temporary disability continues and that the Governor, Governor-elect, or person acting as Governor is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office.
(c) Each determination of a disability under Subsection (6)(a) shall be final and conclusive.
(7) The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this section.

Vermont
Ch. 2, § 24
The Legislature shall provide by general law what officer shall act as Governor whenever there shall be a vacancy
in both the offices of Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, occasioned by a failure to elect, or by the removal from
office, or by the death or resignation of both Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, or by the inability of both
Governor and Lieutenant-Governor to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the office of Governor; and
such officer so designated, shall exercise the powers and discharge the duties appertaining to the office of
Governor accordingly until the disability shall be removed, or a Governor shall be elected. And in case there shall
be a vacancy in the office of Treasurer, by reason of any of the causes enumerated, the Governor shall appoint a
Treasurer for the time being, who shall act as Treasurer until the disability shall be removed, or a new election
shall be made.

Virginia
VA. CONST. art. V, § 16
Whenever the Governor transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Delegates his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Lieutenant Governor as Acting Governor.
Whenever the Attorney General, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Delegates, or a majority of the total membership of the General Assembly, transmit to the Clerk of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House of Delegates their written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting Governor.
Thereafter, when the Governor transmits to the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Delegates his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Attorney
General, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Delegates, or a majority of the
total membership of the General Assembly, transmit within four days to the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of
the House of Delegates their written declaration that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon the General Assembly shall decide the issue, convening within forty-eight hours for that
purpose if not already in session. If within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter declaration or, if the General
Assembly is not in session, within twenty-one days after the General Assembly is required to convene, the
General Assembly determines by three-fourths vote of the elected membership of each house of the General
Assembly that the Governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Lieutenant Governor
shall become Governor; otherwise, the Governor shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Washington
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 10
In case of the removal, resignation, death or disability of the governor, the duties of the office shall devolve upon
the lieutenant governor; and in case of a vacancy in both the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, the
duties of the governor shall devolve upon the secretary of state. In addition to the line of succession to the office
and duties of governor as hereinabove indicated, if the necessity shall arise, in order to fill the vacancy in the
office of governor, the following state officers shall succeed to the duties of governor and in the order named,
viz.: Treasurer, auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction and commissioner of public lands.
In case of the death, disability, failure or refusal of the person regularly elected to the office of governor to
qualify at the time provided by law, the duties of the office shall devolve upon the person regularly elected to and
qualified for the office of lieutenant governor, who shall act as governor until the disability be removed, or a
governor be elected; and in case of the death, disability, failure or refusal of both the governor and the lieutenant
governor elect to qualify, the duties of the governor shall devolve upon the secretary of state; and in addition to
the line of succession to the office and duties of governor as hereinabove indicated, if there shall be the failure or
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refusal of any officer named above to qualify, and if the necessity shall arise by reason thereof, then in that event
in order to fill the vacancy in the office of governor, the following state officers shall succeed to the duties of
governor in the order named, viz: Treasurer, auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction and
commissioner of public lands. Any person succeeding to the office of governor as in this section provided, shall
perform the duties of such office only until the disability be removed, or a governor be elected and qualified; and
if a vacancy occur more than thirty days before the next general election occurring within two years after the
commencement of the term, a person shall be elected at such election to fill the office of governor for the
remainder of the unexpired term.

West Virginia
W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 16
In case of the death, conviction or impeachment, failure to qualify, resignation, or other disability of the governor,
the president of the Senate shall act as governor until the vacancy is filled, or the disability removed; and if the
president of the Senate, for any of the above named causes, shall become incapable of performing the duties of
governor, the same shall devolve upon the speaker of the House of Delegates; and in all other cases where there is
no one to act as governor, one shall be chosen by joint vote of the Legislature. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in
the office of governor before the first three years of the term shall have expired, a new election for governor shall
take place to fill the vacancy.

Wisconsin
WIS. CONST. art. V, § 8
(2) If the governor is absent from this state, impeached, or from mental or physical disease, becomes incapable of
performing the duties of the office, the lieutenant governor shall serve as acting governor for the balance of the
unexpired term or until the governor returns, the disability ceases or the impeachment is vacated. But when the
governor, with the consent of the legislature, shall be out of this state in time of war at the head of the state’s
military force, the governor shall continue as commander in chief of the military force.

Wyoming
WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 6
If the governor be impeached, displaced, resign or die, or from mental or physical disease or otherwise become
incapable of performing the duties of his office or be absent from the state, the secretary of state shall act as
governor until the vacancy is filled or the disability removed.
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Appendix C: Survey of State Gubernatorial Absence Provisions
State
Alabama

Constitutional
Provision
Art. V, § 127

Alaska

Art. III, § 9

Arizona

Art. V, § 6

Arkansas

Art. VI, § 12

California

Art. V, § 10

Colorado

Art. IV, § 13(5)

Connecticut

Art. IV, § 18

Hawaii

Art. V, § 4

Idaho

Art. IV, § 12

Text
…If the governor shall be absent from the state over twenty days,
the secretary of state shall notify the lieutenant governor, who shall
enter upon the duties of governor…
In case of the temporary absence of the governor from office, the
lieutenant governor shall serve as acting governor.
…In the event of the impeachment of the governor, his absence
from the state, or other temporary disability to discharge the duties
of the office, the powers and duties of the office of governor shall
devolve upon the same person as in case of vacancy, but only until
the disability ceases.
In case of the death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify,
resignation, absence from the State, or other disability of the
Governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office for the
remainder of the term, or until the disability be removed, or a
Governor elected and qualified, shall devolve upon, and accrue, to
the President of the Senate.
The Lieutenant Governor shall act as Governor during the
impeachment, absence from the State, or other temporary disability
of the Governor or of a Governor-elect who fails to take office.
…In the event the governor or lieutenant governor, or governor
-elect or lieutenant governor-elect, at the time either of the latter is
to take the oath of office, is absent from the state or is suffering
from a physical or mental disability, the powers and duties of the
office of governor and the office of lieutenant governor shall, until
the absence or disability ceases, temporarily devolve upon the
lieutenant governor, in the case of the governor, and, in the case of
the lieutenant governor, upon the first named member of the
general assembly listed in subsection (7) of this section who is
affiliated with the same political party as the lieutenant governor…
In case of the death, resignation, refusal to serve or removal from
office of the governor, the lieutenant-governor shall, upon taking
the oath of office of governor, be governor of the state until
another is chosen at the next regular election for governor and is
duly qualified. In case of the inability of the governor to exercise
the powers and perform the duties of his office, or in case of his
impeachment or of his absence from the state, the lieutenantgovernor shall exercise the powers and authority and perform the
duties appertaining to the office of governor until the disability is
removed or, if the governor has been impeached, he is acquitted or,
if absent, he has returned.
…In the event of the absence of the governor from the State, or the
governor's inability to exercise and discharge the powers and duties
of the governor's office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon
the lieutenant governor during such absence or disability….
In case of the failure to qualify, the impeachment, or conviction of
treason, felony, or other infamous crime of the governor, or his
death, removal from office, resignation, absence from the state, or
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
powers, duties and emoluments of the office for the residue of the
term, or until the disability shall cease, shall devolve upon the
lieutenant governor.
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Louisiana

Art. IV, § 19

Massachusetts

Pt. 2, ch. 2, § II,
art. III

Michigan

Art. V, § 26

Mississippi

Art. V, § 131

Missouri

Art. IV, § 11(a)

Montana

Art. VI, § 14(2)

Nevada

Art. V, § 18

New
Hampshire

Pt. 2, art. XLIX

New Jersey

Art. V, § 1(7)

When the governor is temporarily absent from the state, the
lieutenant governor shall act as governor. When any other
statewide elected official is temporarily absent from the state, the
appointed first assistant shall act in his absence.
Whenever the chair of the governor shall be vacant, by reason of
his death, or absence from the commonwealth, or otherwise, the
lieutenant governor, for the time being, shall, during such vacancy,
perform all the duties incumbent upon the governor, and shall have
and exercise all the powers and authorities, which by this
constitution the governor is vested with, when personally present.
…If the governor or the person in line of succession to serve as
governor is absent from the state, or suffering under an inability,
the powers and duties of the office of the governor shall devolve in
order of precedence until the absence or inability giving rise to the
devolution of powers ceases.
…When the Governor shall be absent from the state, or unable,
from protracted illness, to perform the duties of the office, the
Lieutenant Governor shall discharge the duties of said office until
the Governor be able to resume his duties…
…On the failure to qualify, absence from the state or other
disability of the governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of
the governor shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for the
remainder of the term or until the disability is removed.
After the governor has been absent from the state for more than 45
consecutive days, the lieutenant governor shall serve as acting
governor.
In case of the impeachment of the Governor, or his removal from
Office, death, inability to discharge the duties of the said Office,
resignation or absence from the State, the powers and duties of the
Office shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor for the residue
of the term, or until the disability shall cease. But when the
Governor shall with the consent of the Legislature be out of the
State, in time of War, and at the head of any military force thereof,
he shall continue Commander in Chief of the military forces of the
State.
In the event of … absence from the state … of the governor, the
president of the senate, for the time being, shall act as governor
until the vacancy is filled or the incapacity is removed…
In the event of the failure of the Governor-elect to qualify, or of the
absence from the State of a Governor in office, … the functions,
powers, duties and emoluments of the office shall devolve upon the
Lieutenant Governor, until … the Governor in office returns to the
State. In the event that the Lieutenant Governor in office is absent
from the State, … the functions, powers, duties, and emoluments
of the office of Governor shall devolve upon the President of the
Senate. In the event of … the Senate President’s absence from the
State, … such functions, powers, duties, and emoluments shall
devolve upon the Speaker of the General Assembly. In the event
… of the Speaker’s absence from the State, … such functions,
powers, duties, and emoluments shall devolve upon such officers
and in the order of succession as may be provided by law. The
functions, powers, duties, and emoluments of the office of
Governor shall devolve upon the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the General Assembly or another officer, as the case
may be, until the Governor-elect or Lieutenant Governor-elect
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New Mexico

Art. V, § 7

New York

Art. IV, § 5

North
Carolina

Art. III, § 3(2)

Oklahoma

Art. IV, § 15

South Carolina

Art. IV, § 11

South Dakota

Art. IV, § 6

Texas

Art. IV, § 16(c)

qualifies, or the Governor or Lieutenant Governor in office returns
to the State, or is no longer unable to discharge the duties of the
office, or is acquitted, or until a new Lieutenant Governor is
appointed, as the case may be, or a new Governor or Lieutenant
Governor is elected and qualifies.
…In case the governor is absent from the state, or is for any reason
unable to perform his duties, the lieutenant governor shall act as
governor, with all the powers, duties and emoluments of that office
until such disability be removed. In case there is no lieutenant
governor, or in case he is for any reason unable to perform the
duties of governor, then the secretary of state shall perform the
duties of governor, and, in case there is no secretary of state, then
the president pro tempore of the senate, or in case there is no
president pro tempore of the senate, or he is for any reason unable
to perform the duties of governor, then the speaker of the house
shall succeed to the office of governor, or act as governor as
hereinbefore provided.
…In case the governor is impeached, is absent from the state or is
otherwise unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office
of governor, the lieutenant-governor shall act as governor until the
inability shall cease or until the term of the governor shall expire.
During the absence of the Governor from the State, or during the
physical or mental incapacity of the Governor to perform the duties
of his office, the Lieutenant Governor shall be Acting Governor.
The further order of succession as Acting Governor shall be
prescribed by law.
If, during a vacancy of the office of Governor, the Lieutenant
Governor shall be … absent from the State, or become incapable of
performing the duties of the office, the president, pro tempore, of
the Senate, shall act as Governor until the vacancy be filled or the
disability shall cease…
Note: There is no absence provision pertaining to absence of the
Governor.
…In the case of the temporary disability of the Governor and in the
event of the temporary absence of the Governor from the State, the
Lieutenant Governor shall have full authority to act in an
emergency….
When the Governor is unable to serve by reason of continuous
absence from the state, or other temporary disability, the executive
power shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for the residue of
the term or until the disability is removed.
…
The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine when a continuous absence from the state or disability
has occurred in the office of the Governor or a permanent vacancy
exists in the office of lieutenant governor.
In the case of the temporary inability or temporary disqualification
of the Governor to serve, the impeachment of the Governor, or the
absence of the Governor from the State, the Lieutenant Governor
shall exercise the powers and authority appertaining to the office of
Governor until the Governor becomes able or qualified to resume
serving, is acquitted, or returns to the State.
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Vermont

Ch. 2, § 20

Wisconsin

Art. V, § 7(2)

Wyoming

Art. IV, § 6

The Governor, and in the Governor’s absence, the LieutenantGovernor, shall have power to [carry out the functions of the office
of the state’s highest executive].
If the governor is absent from this state, impeached, or from mental
or physical disease, becomes incapable of performing the duties of
the office, the lieutenant governor shall serve as acting governor
for the balance of the unexpired term or until the governor returns,
the disability ceases or the impeachment is vacated. But when the
governor, with the consent of the legislature, shall be out of this
state in time of war at the head of the state’s military force, the
governor shall continue as commander in chief of the military
force.
If the governor be impeached, displaced, resign or die, or from
mental or physical disease or otherwise become incapable of
performing the duties of his office or be absent from the state, the
secretary of state shall act as governor until the vacancy is filled or
the disability removed.

40

Appendix D: New York Election Law Committee Proposal
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Appendix F: Alaska-Woods Proposal
Within twenty (20) days of assuming office, either by election or succession to office in case of
vacancy, the governor shall appoint, from among the elected attorney general, the elected
comptroller, the most recently elected temporary president of the senate, and the most recently
elected speaker of the assembly, a person to succeed to the office of lieutenant-governor if the
office of lieutenant-governor becomes vacant. The person designated is next in line for
succession to the office of lieutenant-governor, subject to the pleasure of the governor. If the
person designated is removed from appointment, vacates the appointment, or ceases to meet the
qualifications required for appointment, the governor shall appoint a successor subject to the
same qualifications as the person initially appointed.
If a vacancy occurs in the office of governor and the lieutenant-governor succeeds to the office
of governor or if the office of lieutenant-governor otherwise becomes vacant, the person
designated as next successor to the office of lieutenant-governor as provided in herein succeeds
to the office of lieutenant-governor for the remainder of the term vacated. Within twenty (20)
days of the appointed successor assuming the office of lieutenant-governor, the governor shall
appoint a person to succeed to office of lieutenant-governor in case of subsequent vacancy from
among the potential candidates identified in the previous paragraph.
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Appendix G: Hybrid Lieutenant Governor Succession Amendment
Within twenty (20) days of assuming office, either by election or succession to office in case of
vacancy, the governor shall appoint, from among the attorney general, the elected comptroller,
the most recently elected temporary president of the senate, and the most recently elected
speaker of the assembly, a person to succeed to the office of lieutenant-governor if the office of
lieutenant-governor becomes vacant. This appointment shall be subject to confirmation by a
majority of the members of both houses of the legislature, voting separately.
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Appendix H: Proposed Reforms to the Line of Succession
Proposed Amendment to the New York Constitution, Article III, Section 7:

SECTION 1. No person shall serve as a member of the legislature unless he or she is a
citizen of the United States and has been a resident of the state of New York for five years before
the date of their election, nor anyone who has not been for the twelve months immediately
preceding their election, a resident of the county or district where he or she may be chosen.
SECTION 2. No member of the legislature shall – during the time for which he or she
was elected – receive, succeed, or be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the
United States or the state of New York, which shall have been created, or the salaries of which
have been increased during such time. And no person holding any office under the government
of the United States, the state of New York, or under any city government, shall be a member of
either House of the Legislature during their continuance in office.
SECTION 3. If a member of the legislature be elected to congress, appointed, or succeed
to any office, civil or military, under the government of the United States, the state of New York,
or under any city government except as a member of the national guard or naval militia of the
state, or of the reserve forces of the United States, their acceptance thereof shall vacate their seat
in the legislature, providing, however, that a member of the legislature may be appointed
commissioner of deeds or to any office in which he or she shall receive no compensation.
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